The Wish to Know Who Is Safe

While reading the Guardian online, I noticed a headline:

How to spot a psychopath: "It's like the difference between a domestic cat and a wild cat."

It is difficult not to read on. The image is immediate. One cat curls beside the fire, familiar and companionable; the other may look similar, but belongs to a more dangerous world. The headline suggests that human beings also come in these two forms and that the difference, though concealed, can be discerned.

Among the ordinary people around us are predators disguised as neighbours, colleagues, lovers and leaders. If we know the signs, perhaps we can recognise them before they come too close.

The promise is irresistible: danger can be made visible. The uncertain world of human relationships can be divided into those who are safe and those who are not.

Perhaps this promise carries weight because the world itself feels increasingly unstable. Climate disruption, war, political extremism, economic insecurity and rapid technological change have created an atmosphere of diffuse threat.

Artificial intelligence can mimic human voices and produce convincing images. Political leaders disagree not only on what should be done but also on what has happened. Institutions that once claimed authority are no longer widely trusted, yet the alternatives are often even less reliable.

The future no longer feels as continuous with the present.

Our nervous systems are exposed daily to suffering everywhere. Before breakfast, we may see a bomb falling on a distant city, a flood, a forest fire, a starving child, a politician threatening revenge, and a warning that an ordinary item in our home may cause cancer. We are invited to feel alarm, anger and moral responsibility, yet we possess very little power to alter what we see.

The danger is real, but it is also difficult to pinpoint. It does not always present as an immediate threat we can act against. It arrives as vedanā: a feeling that the structures around us are no longer secure, that events are moving too quickly, and that something is wrong, even when we cannot say exactly what.

Diffuse anxiety is particularly difficult to bear. If I know a tiger is approaching, my body can prepare to run. If I feel threatened but cannot identify the threat, my body remains mobilised without resolution. It searches for an object.

A headline such as How to spot a psychopath offers one. Danger has a face. A type of person is responsible for the unease. Here are the signs. Learn them, and you may be safe.

The article itself raises a serious question. The traditional psychopathy checklist, developed by Robert Hare, was based primarily on prison populations. It therefore helped identify those whose violence, impulsivity or disregard for social rules had brought them into contact with the criminal justice system.

What of the intelligent, controlled and socially successful predator who does not get caught? What of the person who causes harm without breaking the law, or who has sufficient authority to prevent the law or an institution from holding them to account?

The article introduces the concept of the "Persistent Predatory Personality": someone who may be grandiose, controlling, deceitful, callous and vengeful, yet adept at presenting an appearance of normality. 

Such people may flourish in corporations, religious communities, families and governments. Their confidence makes their lies convincing. Their charm recruits defenders. Their lack of remorse allows them to continue long after an ordinary person would have been restrained by guilt or shame.

There is something important here. Predatory patterns are real. Coercive control is real. Some people repeatedly exploit trust, reverse responsibility, and undermine the credibility of those who challenge them. 

The language of gaslighting, grooming, and DARVO—deny, attack, and reverse victim and offender—has helped many people make sense of experiences that had previously left them bewildered.

Naming a pattern can restore reality to someone whose perception has been systematically undermined:

I was not imagining it. Something was being done to me.

That recognition can be lifesaving. We should be wary of any sophisticated argument that casts doubt on a harmed person by implying the danger existed only in their perception. Sometimes fear is an appropriate response to what is happening. Sometimes the person who seems charming to everyone else is dangerous in private. Sometimes refusing to see this is not compassion but complicity.

Yet the headline does more than invite us to recognise harmful behaviour. It offers us the possibility of identifying a particular kind of being: the psychopath, the narcissist, the predator, or the wild cat among the domestic cats.

This promise now surrounds us. Almost any newspaper, magazine or social media feed will eventually present us with a headline such as:

How to spot a narcissist.

Seven signs you are being manipulated.

The phrase psychopaths always use.

How to tell if your partner is gaslighting you.

The language is psychological, yet the emotional appeal is ancient. How do we know who belongs to the tribe? How do we recognise the stranger who means us harm? How can we protect ourselves against betrayal?

These articles offer more than information. They offer mastery. The world may be unstable, institutions unreliable, and the future unknowable, but perhaps I can learn to recognise the dangerous individual standing immediately in front of me. Instead of confronting forces too large and complex for me to control, I can inspect my partner, parent, colleague, therapist or employer for signs of narcissism.

The attention economy intensifies this process. A settled person may read the article, reflect on it, and put the phone down. A frightened person keeps reading article after article. The headline creates alarm; the checklist offers a brief sense of certainty; the next headline reactivates it.

An unpleasant feeling arrives before any thought. Buddhist teaching has a word for this moment of bare contact, vedanā, and a word for what happens next: the mind cannot rest in the feeling, so it reaches for something solid. That reaching is taṇhā, craving, and it will grasp an explanation as readily as an object.

The solution perpetuates the problem. The more material we consume on recognising dangerous people, the more danger-saturated the human world may seem. Once we have read one article about narcissism, an algorithm will offer us twenty more. Gradually, a useful psychological concept becomes an entire interpretative framework.

Ordinary human difficulties are reinterpreted through its language. Affection becomes love-bombing. Disagreement becomes gaslighting. Emotional withdrawal becomes narcissistic punishment. Clumsiness becomes manipulation. A failed apology becomes proof of psychopathy. We begin to scrutinise relationships as if safety depended on detecting a concealed diagnosis.

This vigilance can feel like wisdom, particularly after we have been hurt, yet intimacy becomes almost impossible if every ambiguity is treated as a sign of danger.

Other people are inherently uncertain. We encounter their faces, words and actions, but we cannot see directly into their minds. Someone may declare love and later abandon us. Someone may promise loyalty while quietly undermining us. Another person may seem distant or difficult yet prove steadfast when we need them most. Even those we know intimately remain partly unknown.

This is an unavoidable condition of a relationship. To trust is to act without complete knowledge.

"How to spot a psychopath" promises relief from this uncertainty. It suggests that the signs are evident if only we become sufficiently informed. Learn the checklist, identify the type, and avoid the danger. Knowledge will keep us safe.

This is not entirely mistaken. We can become more discerning. We can recognise coercive patterns, attend to discrepancies between words and actions, and take seriously the effects a relationship has on us. Yet the wish for discernment can quietly become a wish for certainty, and certainty about another person is a dangerous possession.

This is the refuge defending itself. Once I decide someone is a narcissist, almost everything they do may seem to confirm my judgement, because any evidence to the contrary would return me to the very feeling the diagnosis was meant to escape. 

Their charm becomes manipulation. Their vulnerability becomes performance. Their confidence becomes grandiosity. Their distress becomes narcissistic injury. Their kindness becomes grooming. If they apologise, the apology is tactical; if they defend themselves, their denial proves the diagnosis. Even evidence of generosity can be absorbed into the theory as image management.

The explanation is complete because nothing can disprove it.

At this point, I am no longer observing the other person. I interpret them through a closed system in which I possess the truth about who they are, and they lose the authority to speak about their own experience. If they challenge my account, that challenge becomes further evidence against them.

There is an irony here. The label intended to protect me from manipulation may itself become an instrument of power. I claim privileged knowledge of another person's inner life, thereby rendering their objections meaningless. In a mild yet significant way, I may enact the very process I believe I have identified: I turn the other person from a subject into an object of my certainty.

This does not necessarily mean my judgement is wrong. The person may indeed behave in persistently exploitative and dangerous ways. Yet there is a difference between recognising what someone repeatedly does and imagining that I have discovered who they essentially are.

Grammar obscures that difference. "Behaves narcissistically" becomes "is a narcissist". "Acts in a predatory manner" becomes "is a predator". A shifting verb is transformed into a permanent noun.

The noun is emotionally satisfying. It seems to explain the past and predict the future. The other person becomes fixed as the dangerous one, while I become fixed as the one who has seen through them. A complex and painful relationship is reduced to innocence and guilt, domestic cat and wild cat.

Buddhist thought offers a profound challenge to this way of knowing. The Buddha consistently directs attention away from fixed identities and towards actions, conditions and consequences. Greed, hatred and delusion are not essential properties of a distinct human species. They are possibilities within the human mind.

In the ordinary sense, I can be predatory. I can also show respect and allow space. Both may occur within a single conversation.

I may begin by listening to you, only to become determined that you should agree with me. Perhaps your disagreement sparks a flash of shame or uncertainty I cannot tolerate. I interrupt, press my advantage, or subtly redefine what you have said. I use my intelligence, confidence, or authority to make your experience conform to mine. You cease to be another centre of experience and become an obstacle to my need for security.

A moment later, something shifts. I notice your withdrawal, hear the harshness in my voice, or feel the tension in my body. I realise I am no longer meeting you. If I can tolerate the discomfort of that realisation, I may soften my stance. I may ask what you were trying to say. I may allow you to remain different from me.

The movement from predation to respect is not necessarily dramatic. It may occur whenever I relinquish the attempt to colonise another person's experience.

Predation, understood in this ordinary relational sense, begins when the other becomes an instrument of my regulation. I may want admiration, agreement, reassurance, obedience, forgiveness, or silence. The desire itself is human. What matters is whether I recognise that you exist beyond its fulfilment.

Respect does not require passivity or agreement. It means allowing the other person a reality that is not entirely organised around me. You may disappoint me, oppose me, or set a boundary I dislike, yet I continue to recognise you as a subject rather than reducing you to an enemy, a traitor, or a defective object.

This movement can be understood through dependent origination. A painful feeling arises. I crave relief. I cling to an identity: the one who is right, the one who knows, the one who has been wronged. From that clinging, I become a particular self in relation to you, and you are cast in the corresponding role. 

If I become the innocent victim, you must become the persecutor. If I become the unquestionable authority, you must become the ignorant one. If I become the saviour, you must remain dependent on being saved.

The relational world is constructed rapidly, often before either person can perceive it.

What interrupts this sequence is not the absence of feeling but the capacity to remember it accurately. Sati, ordinarily translated as mindfulness, has a root closer to memory than to the watching of breath or sensation, which it has come to mean in common usage. 

What must be remembered is not an isolated moment but a sequence: this happened, then this, then this, cause followed by effect, without the sequence being rewritten by whatever feeling renders the plain sequence unbearable. 

I feel the unpleasant sensation beneath my certainty. I notice the wish to win or punish. I recognise that the identity I am defending has arisen conditionally and need not dictate the next moment.

From this perspective, neither "predator" nor "respectful person" describes an unchanging self. They describe ways in which experience and relationships are organised. Yet this does not mean that everyone is equally dangerous or that enduring character patterns are unreal.

Actions repeated over time become habits; habits become dispositions; dispositions shape character. A person who repeatedly lies, exploits vulnerability, punishes disagreement and refuses responsibility becomes increasingly likely to repeat these behaviours.

Buddhist teachings on karma are clear on this. Every intention leaves the ground more receptive to similar intentions. Repeated cruelty becomes easier. Deception gradually reshapes a person's relationship with truth. The suffering of others becomes less visible.

There may be no fixed predator, but persistent predatory behaviour can certainly occur.

The distinction between ordinary human predation and a severely dangerous pattern does not lie in whether a controlling or narcissistic impulse ever appears. It lies in the intensity, frequency and rigidity of the impulse; in the power available to the person; in the scale of the harm produced; and, perhaps most revealingly, in what happens when the behaviour is brought to their attention.

Can the person experience remorse without resorting to self-defence? Can they acknowledge a specific injury without immediately invoking what was done to them? Can they tolerate the shame of having caused harm? Can they repair, and is that repair followed by sustained change?

Most of us do not become safe by never behaving predatorily. We become safer through our capacity to recognise the other person again.

Someone organised around persistent predation may respond very differently. The challenge is perceived as an intolerable threat. Responsibility is denied, the challenger is attacked, and the roles of victim and offender are reversed. The purpose of the conversation ceases to be understanding or repair; it becomes restoring control.

This is why Buddhist non-essentialism must not be confused with naïveté. To say that a person has no fixed self is not to suggest that we should ignore the reliable patterns of their behaviour. Causes and conditions are real in their effects. A hurricane has no permanent essence, yet it would be unwise to stand in its path.

Compassion does not require trust. Understanding the conditions behind someone's behaviour does not entail granting them ongoing access to us. Forgiveness, if it occurs, does not abolish boundaries. We may sincerely wish for someone to be free from hatred and delusion while recognising that it is unsafe to remain close to them.

The problem with the wild-cat metaphor is not that wild animals cannot be dangerous. It is that the image encourages us to imagine humanity as divided into distinct breeds, one with empathy and conscience and the other merely imitating them.

The person reading the article is subtly positioned among the domestic cats. We are the cooperative, altruistic people whom psychopaths exploit. Greed, hatred and delusion belong to the dangerous other. We need only learn to recognise them.

What if the wish to classify people so completely is partly an attempt to avoid recognising our own aggression? The psychopath embodies what the rest of us cannot easily acknowledge: our wish to dominate, our capacity for deception, our pleasure in winning, and our indifference to another's pain. By locating these qualities in a separate type of human being, we preserve our innocence.

The cultural popularity of the narcissist may partly depend on this. The narcissist becomes a vessel into which we project the destructiveness of failed relationships. Former partners, parents, friends, employers and political opponents can all be grouped under the same label.

Their behaviour may indeed have been damaging, yet the label can also relieve us of the more difficult work of examining the relational field: what happened between us, what each person could and could not bear, what power was exercised, and what remains unacknowledged within ourselves.

This does not mean responsibility is always equal. A relational understanding should never become a polite way of blaming the victim. In coercive relationships, differences in power, intention and consequences matter enormously. One person may be trying, imperfectly, to survive, while the other systematically controls the conditions for survival.

Even when responsibility is profoundly unequal, understanding behaviour as relational and conditioned is distinct from claiming to know another person's essence completely.

Perhaps the better questions are more modest:

What happens around this person over time? Can disagreement occur without retaliation? Are boundaries respected, even when inconvenient? Do words match actions? Can harm be acknowledged without responsibility being reversed? Does an apology lead to changed behaviour? What happens to my sense of reality during prolonged contact with this person? Do I become increasingly frightened, confused, isolated or dependent?

These questions do not tell me what another person ultimately is. They may, nevertheless, tell me how close it is wise to stand.

That is discernment rather than diagnosis. It depends on a specific capacity: the ability to remember accurately and to hold a sequence of cause and effect in view without editing it. Editing usually runs in one of two directions. Fear of being alone can rewrite repeated harm as a bad day. The belief that the situation can still be fixed can rewrite a settled pattern as a passing exception. 

The same craving that manufactures danger where none exists can also erase danger that is actually present, and in both cases it uses memory itself as the material it revises.

Discernment, then, neither dismisses fear nor treats it as infallible. It is the plainer, harder discipline of letting the sequence stand as it was.

Our fear is always trying to protect us. It draws on past experience to anticipate what will happen next. If I have been betrayed, humiliated or controlled, I may become acutely attuned to signs of similar danger. That vigilance may help me perceive what others miss. It may also lead me to interpret uncertainty as a threat and to treat the resulting fear as proof that my interpretation is correct.

What happens in one frightened mind can also happen in a frightened population. The wild cat that a reader learns to spot in a single relationship has a counterpart at a larger scale: a population living with economic insecurity, political fragmentation and rapid social change becomes more receptive to explanations that identify who is to blame.

The world's threatening complexity is condensed into a group, a leader, an immigrant, an elite, an ideology, or a personality type. Fear becomes more manageable when it has an object, but it also becomes easier to manipulate.

Certainty can therefore be dangerous. If I am certain I know who the dangerous people are, I may feel justified in no longer listening to them. In times of collective fear, the desire for safety can create scapegoats. The supposedly dangerous other absorbs the group's anxiety and gives it somewhere to go.

This does not mean that all threats are projections. Dangerous individuals and political movements exist. Real and projected dangers can coexist. Someone may pose a genuine threat, while our fear can also simplify, exaggerate and essentialise that threat. Mature discernment must hold both possibilities without collapsing into either naïve trust or paranoid certainty.

From a Buddhist perspective, the movement is now familiar. Uncertainty is experienced as the same unpleasant feeling, and the same craving seeks the same kind of solid ground: not sense pleasure this time, but a view. 

The Buddha distinguished clinging to a view, diṭṭhupādāna, from clinging to sense pleasure as one of four kinds of upādāna. A view held tightly enough ceases to be a view and becomes the truth of things:

This is what is happening. That is the kind of person they are. I am the kind of person who can see it.

The explanation may contain considerable truth. The difficulty arises when we require it to protect us from ambiguity. It is no longer merely a provisional way of understanding experience. It has become a refuge, and refuges built this way must be defended, since any evidence against them returns us to the unpleasant feeling we were trying to escape.

Buddhism does not reassure us that the world is safe. The Buddha begins by recognising that embodied life is inherently unstable. What we love changes. What we depend on can be lost. Our bodies are vulnerable to illness, ageing and death. The term dukkha captures this inability to secure lasting safety amid changing conditions.

Our historical moment intensifies that insecurity, but it did not create it. The human temptation has always been to find something, whether wealth, status, ideology, identity, relationship or knowledge, that will finally make the unstable secure.

The headline promises something no checklist can finally deliver. It promises that we can know in advance who is safe. No psychological knowledge can remove vulnerability from human relationships. Trust will always exceed the evidence available to us. Intimacy will always carry the possibility of injury. We can reduce unnecessary risk, but we cannot become invulnerable without also becoming unreachable.

Perhaps this is why such headlines are so compelling. Beneath the wish to spot a psychopath lies the wish never again to be taken by surprise. Never again to discover that the person beside the fire belonged to another world. Never again to feel foolish for having trusted.

That wish deserves compassion, but it cannot be fully satisfied.

The task is not to silence fear. It is to listen to it without surrendering the whole field of perception to it. We do not need to decide what kind of being someone is in order to respond to their repeated actions. We can recognise danger, set boundaries and leave destructive situations without claiming to know the final truth about another person.

We can acknowledge our capacity for predation without pretending that all patterns of harm are equivalent. We can protect ourselves without dividing humanity into the innocent and the irredeemable.

The question, then, may not be "How do I identify the dangerous kind of person?"

It may be: "How do I remain perceptive and able to protect myself without turning the uncertainty of a relationship into a fixed narrative about another human being?"

There will be no perfect answer. Only an ongoing practice of remembering accurately: noticing what is happening, taking patterns seriously, listening to fear, staying aware of our own participation, and letting evidence outweigh labels.

Even this practice will fail us at times. We will trust someone who should not have been trusted and doubt someone who deserved better. We will mistake a wild cat for a domestic one, or vice versa, and live with that mistake for a while before we can see it.

The wish beneath the headline, to know in advance who is safe, does not go away just because we have understood its origin. It only becomes a wish we recognise as it moves through us, still wanting what it cannot have.


Glossary of Pāli Terms

Dukkha — Usually translated as suffering, though the term is broader than the English word "pain." It points to the fundamental unsatisfactoriness of a life built on conditions that cannot be held fast: what we love changes, what we depend on can be lost, and the body itself is subject to illness, ageing and death. It is named as the first of the Buddha's Four Noble Truths (SN 56.11).

Diṭṭhupādāna — Clinging to a view. The second of the four kinds of upādāna described in the early texts (the others being clinging to sense pleasure, to rites and observances, and to a doctrine of self; MN 11). This is the specific clinging at work when an explanation, once adopted, ceases to function as a provisional way of understanding a person or situation and hardens into the truth of the matter.

Kamma (Sanskrit: karma) — Intentional action and the principle that such action shapes future tendencies. Every intention leaves the mind more disposed towards similar intentions: cruelty repeated becomes easier, and deception gradually reshapes a person's relationship to truth. Kamma is not fate; it is the accumulating weight of habit formed through repeated choice.

Paṭicca-samuppāda — Dependent origination. The teaching that phenomena, including the sense of self and the roles we assign to others in a relationship, arise dependently on conditions rather than existing as fixed, independent essences. Feeling gives rise to craving, craving to clinging, and clinging to a particular kind of becoming. Thus, a self and its counterpart (victim and persecutor, authority and the ignorant one) are constructed in relation to each other, moment by moment.

Sati — Ordinarily translated as mindfulness, though the translation has narrowed the word's meaning in common usage to the observation of breath or bodily sensation. Its root is closer to memory. What sati holds in view is not an isolated instant but a sequence, cause followed by effect, remembered as it actually occurred rather than rewritten by whatever feeling renders the plain sequence unbearable.

Taṇhā — Craving. The mind’s reaching towards relief once an unpleasant feeling (vedanā) has arisen. Taṇhā does not require a physical object; it grasps as readily at an explanation, a diagnosis, or a fixed identity as at anything material. It is named as the origin of dukkha in the Second Noble Truth (SN 56.11).

Upādāna — Clinging or grasping; the stage at which craving intensifies into a sustained hold on its object. See diṭṭhupādāna above for the specific form most relevant to this essay.

Vedanā — feeling or sensation, in the specific technical sense of the immediate, pre-cognitive quality of an experience as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. Vedanā arises before any thought or interpretation is added; uncertainty, for instance, makes contact as vedanā before it becomes a story about who is dangerous and why.

Rory Singer

You can also read this post on our Substack journal, Unfolding.

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